HaxorSec [ prasadayoga.de ]

CPU LOAD

23.83

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MEMORY

251.52 GB

0% 85.37%

DISK

19.06 GB

0% 27.24%

UPTIME

233h 19m

HOSTNAME

Linux info 3.0 #1337 SMP Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 CEST 2000 all GNU/Linux

SOFTWARE

Apache

IP ADDRESS

82.165.86.186

USER

p6825144

PHP VERSION

8.3.31

NAME

SIZE

PERMISSIONS

ACTIONS

local

[DIR] drwxr-xr-x

[DIR]

drwxr-xr-x

usr.bin.man

3.37 KB -rw-r--r--

3.37 KB

-rw-r--r--

usr.bin.msmtp

1.5 KB -rw-r--r--

1.5 KB

-rw-r--r--

Code Editor : usr.bin.man

# vim:syntax=apparmor

#include <tunables/global>

/usr/bin/man {
  #include <abstractions/base>

# Use a special profile when man calls anything groff-related.  We only
  # include the programs that actually parse input data in a non-trivial
  # way, not wrappers such as groff and nroff, since the latter would need a
  # broader profile.
  /usr/bin/eqn rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/grap rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/pic rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/preconv rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/refer rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/tbl rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/troff rmCx -> &man_groff,
  /usr/bin/vgrind rmCx -> &man_groff,

# Similarly, use a special profile when man calls decompressors and other
  # simple filters.
  /{,usr/}bin/bzip2 rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /{,usr/}bin/gzip rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /usr/bin/col rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /usr/bin/compress rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /usr/bin/iconv rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /usr/bin/lzip.lzip rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /usr/bin/tr rmCx -> &man_filter,
  /usr/bin/xz rmCx -> &man_filter,

# Allow basically anything in terms of file system access, subject to DAC.
  # The purpose of this profile isn't to confine man itself (that might be
  # nice in the future, but is tricky since it's quite configurable), but to
  # confine the processes it calls that parse untrusted data.
  /** mrixwlk,
  unix,

capability setuid,
  capability setgid,

# Ordinary permission checks sometimes involve checking whether the
  # process has this capability, which can produce audit log messages.
  # Silence them.
  deny capability dac_override,
  deny capability dac_read_search,

signal peer=@{profile_name},
  signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_groff,
  signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_filter,

# Site-specific additions and overrides.  See local/README for details.
  #include <local/usr.bin.man>
}

profile man_groff {
  #include <abstractions/base>
  # Recent kernels revalidate open FDs, and there are often some still
  # open on TTYs.  This is temporary until man learns to close irrelevant
  # open FDs before execve.
  #include <abstractions/consoles>
  # man always runs its groff pipeline with the input file open on stdin,
  # so we can skip <abstractions/user-manpages>.

/usr/bin/eqn rm,
  /usr/bin/grap rm,
  /usr/bin/pic rm,
  /usr/bin/preconv rm,
  /usr/bin/refer rm,
  /usr/bin/tbl rm,
  /usr/bin/troff rm,
  /usr/bin/vgrind rm,

/etc/groff/** r,
  /etc/papersize r,
  /usr/lib/groff/site-tmac/** r,
  /usr/share/groff/** r,

/tmp/groff* rw,

signal peer=/usr/bin/man,
  # @{profile_name} doesn't seem to work here.
  signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_groff,
}

profile man_filter {
  #include <abstractions/base>
  # Recent kernels revalidate open FDs, and there are often some still
  # open on TTYs.  This is temporary until man learns to close irrelevant
  # open FDs before execve.
  #include <abstractions/consoles>

/{,usr/}bin/bzip2 rm,
  /{,usr/}bin/gzip rm,
  /usr/bin/col rm,
  /usr/bin/compress rm,
  /usr/bin/iconv rm,
  /usr/bin/lzip.lzip rm,
  /usr/bin/tr rm,
  /usr/bin/xz rm,

# Manual pages can be more or less anywhere, especially with "man -l", and
  # there's no harm in allowing wide read access here since the worst it can
  # do is feed data to the invoking man process.
  /** r,

# Allow writing cat pages.
  /var/cache/man/** w,

signal peer=/usr/bin/man,
  # @{profile_name} doesn't seem to work here.
  signal peer=/usr/bin/man//&man_filter,
}

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